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THEORY: DECISIONS UNDER RISK, UNCERTAINTY,
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FEDERICO ECHENIQUE
Abstract. The chapter reviews recent developments in revealed
preference theory. It discusses the testable implications of theo-
ries of choice that are germane to specific economic environments.
The focus is on expected utility in risky environments; subjected
expected utility and maxmin expected utility in the presence of
uncertainty; and exponentially discounted utility for intertempo-
ral choice. The testable implications of these theories for data on
choice from classical linear budget sets are described, and shown
to follow a common thread. The theories all imply an inverse re-
lation between prices and quantities, with different qualifications
depending on the functional forms in the theory under considera-
tion.
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1. Introduction
Revealed preference theory has a long and distinguished history in
economics, giving empirical meaning to the hypothesis of rationality
in neoclassical economics. The investigations of Samuelson (1938),
Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973), and Varian (1982)
clarified the precise behavioral meaning of the hypothesis that a con-
sumer maximizes utility.
The theory culminates in the celebrated Afriat’s theorem (Theo-
rem 1 below), which states that the empirical content of rational be-
havior (by a locally non-satiated consumer) is the same as that of a
consumer with a monotone increasing and concave utility function. In
turn, the datasets that are consistent with the theory are those that
satisfy Afriat’s “Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference” (GARP;
the terminology is due to Varian (1982)).1
While the older literature deals with general utility maximization,
recent developments in revealed preference theory have sought to un-
derstand the empirical content of specific theories of rational choice, in
specific economic environments. This work is the focus of the present
chapter. I shall focus on decision under risk, uncertainty, and intertem-
poral choice. Within each of these domains, there are theories that
stand out as ubiquitous in economic modeling: expected utility the-
ory for choice under risk, subjective expected utility for choice under
uncertainty, and exponential discounting for intertemporal choice.
I shall describe how the GARP needs to be strengthened to capture
each of the specific theories in question. For most of the discussion, I
will consider the theories under the additional assumption that pref-
erences are convex. As a consequence, first-order conditions suffice to
1There are a number of existing surveys of the revealed prefer-
ence literature: see Varian (2006); Carvajal, Ray, and Snyder (2004);
Cherchye, Crawford, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2009); Crawford and De Rock
(2014); Chambers and Echenique (2016).
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characterize optimizing behavior, which affords some significant sim-
plifications.
We shall see that the relevant strengthenings of GARP all have the
flavor of a negative relation between prices and quantities. For ex-
ample, a risk-averse expected-utility agent who chooses to consume
more conditional on state s1 than conditional on state s2, must either
think that s1 is more likely than s2, or face cheaper prices for con-
sumption conditional on state s1 than on s2. Such simple statements
can be combined to provide a precise characterizations of risk-averse
expected utility theory. More generally, all the theories under consid-
eration imply that the data display a negative relation between prices
and quantities under certain qualifications that can be traced to the
functional form assumed by the theory.
2. The model
2.1. Notational conventions and basic definitions. For vectors
x, y ∈ Rn, x ≤ y means that xi ≤ yi for all i = 1, . . . , n; x < y
means that x ≤ y and x 6= y; and x ≪ y means that xi < yi for all
i = 1, . . . , n. The set of all x ∈ Rn with 0 ≤ x is denoted by Rn+, and
the set of all x ∈ Rn with 0≪ x is denoted by Rn++.
Next, consider given a finite sequence {xk : k = 1, . . . , K} in Rn.
For each k we have a collection of real numbers xk1, . . . , x
k
n, and we can
imagine forming pairs of elements drawn from
{xkl : 1 ≤ k ≤ K; 1 ≤ l ≤ n}.
Two properties of such sequences of pairs will be important, and their
importance will become clear later on.
Definition 1. A sequence of pairs (xkili , x
k′
i
l′
i
)Ii=1 is balanced if each k
appears as ki (on the left of the pair) the same number of times it
appears as k′i (on the right).
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Definition 2. A balanced sequence of pairs (xkili , x
k′
i
l′
i
)Ii=1 is doubly bal-
anced if each l appears as li (on the left of the pair) the same number
of times it appears as s′i (on the right).
2.2. The model. I shall exclusively consider the neoclassical theory of
the consumer. The theory specifies as primitive a consumption space
X , which is a subset of some Euclidean space, and a collection U of
utility function u : X → R. Throughout this chapter, X will be Rn+,
the positive orthant of Rn. I shall deal with risk, uncertainty, and
intertemporal tradeoffs simply by adopting different interpretations for
the vectors in Rn+. In the abstract, the vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n
+
involves consumption of xl units of “good” l. By interpreting the word
“good” we can capture risk, uncertainty, and intertemporal choice.2
In each case we shall appropriately restrict U to capture the most
commonly considered theories of choice under risk and uncertainty, or
intertemporal choice. To sum up, then, a pair (X,U) describes the
theory under consideration; and for the purpose of this chapter I shall
take X to equal the positive orthant of some Euclidean space.
The second order of business is to specify what is assumed observable:
what is the available data. I shall focus on choice data drawn from the
neoclassical theory of the consumer. Specifically:
Definition 3. A dataset is a finite collection of pairs (x, p) ∈ Rn+ ×
Rn++.
The source of a dataset is a consumer, whom we have recorded mak-
ing a finite collection of choices. In actual empirical applications of the
theory, the data can come from consumption surveys drawn from the
field, from a laboratory experiment, or from a hybrid design.
Each choice consists of an element x ∈ Rn+ selected from a budget
B(p, I) = {z ∈ Rn+ : p · z ≤ I};
2Debreu (1959) contains a well-known discussion of such interpretations.
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where p is a price vector, and I = p · x is income. Note that (x, p)
describes all we need to know about the choice and about the budget.
The vector p is the relevant price vector, and p·x is the relevant income.
Of course, this presumes that expenditure exhausts income: some times
this assumption may be questionable.
Next, we spell out the empirical content of a theory. The empirical
content consists of all the datasets that are consistent with the the-
ory.3 Given a collection of utility functions U , we say that a data set
(xk, pk)Kk=1 is U-rational if there exists U ∈ U such that, for each k,
xk ∈ argmax{U(x) : x ∈ B(pk, pk · xk)}.
2.2.1. General utilities. For context, I give a quick overview of the most
important result in revealed preference theory: Afriat’s theorem.
To this end, let ULNS be the set of locally non-satiated utility func-
tions, and UMC be the set of strictly monotonic and concave utility
functions.
Given a dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1, we can define two binary relations on
Rn+. First, say that x R
P y, “x is revealed preferred to y,” if there
exists k such that x = xk, and pk · y ≤ pk · xk. Second, say that that
x P P y, “x is strictly revealed preferred to y,” if there exists k such
that x = xk, and pk · y < pk · xk.
A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 satisfies theWeak Axiom of Revealed Preference
(WARP) if there is no pair of observations k and k′ such that xk RP
xk
′
while xk
′
P P xk. A dataset that violates WARP cannot be ULNS
rational.
A dataset (xk, pk)Kk=1 satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed
Preference (GARP) if, for any finite sequence (ki)
M
i=1 in {1, . . . , K}, if
xki RP xki+1 for i = 1, . . . ,M −1, implies that is false that xkM P P xk1 .
Theorem 1. Let (xk, pk)Kk=1 be a dataset. The following statements
are equivalent.
3See Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2014) for a formal study of empirical
content.
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(1) The dataset is ULNS -rational.
(2) The dataset satisfies GARP.
(3) There are scalars V k and λk > 0, for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, such that
V k ≤ V k
′
+ λk
′
pk
′
· (xk − xk
′
)
for 1 ≤ k, k′ ≤ K.
(4) The dataset is UMC -rational.
Theorem 1 is due to Afriat (1967) (see also Diewert (1973) and
Varian (1982)). A proof (in fact, two proofs) and a detailed discussion
of Afriat’s theorem can be found in Chambers and Echenique (2016).
The system of linear inequalities in Statement (3) is termed “Afriat
inequalities,” and can be seen as fitting the data to the first-order con-
ditions that characterize an optimum. In the rest of the chapter, the
idea of fitting the data to the relevant first-order conditions will be the
source of many results.
The best-known implication of Theorem 1 is that if a dataset is
ULNS -rational, then it is also UMB rational. In other words, the hy-
pothesis that a consumer chooses as if maximizing a concave utility
has the same empirical content as the seemingly much laxer hypothesis
of maximizing a locally non-satiated utility.
2.2.2. Specific utilities. In this chapter, I shall focus on choice under
risk and uncertainty, and intertemporal choice. For the case of risk
and uncertainty, I suppose that there is a finite set S of states of the
world ; let |S| = n. In this case, a consumption vector x ∈ Rn+ consists
of a state-contingent payoff. There is a single physical good; think
of this good as money, and the state-contingent payoff is in units of
money. Put differently, the consumer chooses a delivery x ∈ RS+ of
money that depends on the state. The consumer could have access
to financial markets in which a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities are
traded, and obtain x as the payoff derived from a portfolio of Arrow-
Debreu securities. The price vector p reflects the prices of the securities,
and income I = p · x is how much the consumer can afford to spend.
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For intertemporal choice, I shall assume that there are T time periods
(T = n), and x ∈ RT+ represents consumption over time. Again, there
is a single good, termed “money,” and x ∈ RT+ is a consumption path,
representing dated quantities of consumption.
3. Additive separability
As an introduction to the main ideas in the chapter, I shall consider
the theory of additively separable utility. In the case of intertemporal
choice, additive separability coincides with no-discounting stationary
utility (as analyzed, for example, by Browning (1989), but more on that
later in the chapter). In the case of choice under risk or uncertainty,
a consumer with additive utility has a uniform prior over states. All
states are equally likely.
Let UAS be the class of utility functions U : R
n
+ → R for which
there exists a concave and strictly increasing u : R+ → R such that
U(x) ≥ U(y) if and only if
n∑
l=1
u(xl) ≥
n∑
l=1
u(yl).
Consider the problem that a UAS -rational consumer is supposed to
be solving, or acting as if she is solving:
max{
n∑
l=1
u(xl) : x ∈ B(p, I)}.
Suppose, for the purpose of exposition, that u is smooth. Then the first-
order conditions of the maximization problem (assuming an interior
solution) imply that
u′(xl)
u′(xl′)
=
pl
pl′
.
The first-order condition, and the concavity of u, imply that whenever
xl > xl′ it must be the case that
pl
p
l′
≤ 1. In words, larger consumption
of good l than of l′ is only possible when l is cheaper than l′: demand
“slopes down.”
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Figure 1. Additively separable utility
As an example, consider the diagram on the left in Figure 1. It
depicts a budget set where good one is cheaper than good two: the
budget set below the 45-degree line is larger than that above. If a
dataset would include a choice of xˆ on this budget set, it would violate
downward-sloping demand and not be UAS -rational. Choices such as x˜
are, in and of themselves, compatible with UAS. But we shall see that,
together with other observations in a dataset, they can still trigger a
rejection of the theory of additively separable utility.
So the theory of additively separable utility has implications for the
data, a property that we think of as downward-sloping demand: it
says that larger price are associated with smaller quantities.4 We shall
express this downward-sloping demand property in a way that turns
out to be useful for the rest of our analysis:
Definition 4. A sequence of pairs (xkili , x
k′
i
l′
i
)Ii=1 has the downward-sloping
demand property if
xkili > x
k′
i
l′
i
for all i implies that
n∏
i=1
pkili
p
k′
i
l′
i
≤ 1.
4I use the term “downward-sloping demand” for lack of a better one. The prices
and quantities that are being compared correspond to different goods (or states, or
time-periods in later interpretations). In contrast, the term is most often used to
describe a comparative statics property of demand, not how prices and quantities
compare at a given price vector.
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The precise property of datasets we are interested in can be called
the
Strong Axiom of Revealed Additively Separable Utility: Any
balanced sequence of pairs has the risk-neutral downward-sloping prop-
erty.
The Strong Axiom of Revealed Additively Separable Utility is a test
for whether a dataset is UAS -rational.
Theorem 2. A dataset is UAS rational if and only if it satisfies the
Strong Axiom of Revealed Additively Separable Utility
I shall not prove Theorem 2, or any other results stated in this chap-
ter, but a proof can be obtained easily using the technique applied to
prove Theorem 3 below.5
The role of a balanced sequence of pairs in Theorem 2 needs to be
explained. Consider the diagram on the right of Figure 1. It depicts
a dataset with two observations, (p1, x1) and (p2, x2), that violate the
weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP). Hence it cannot be ratio-
nalized by any utility function, let alone by a member of UAS . Theo-
rem 2 implies that the dataset must exhibit some kind of violation of
downward-sloping demand.
If we had a single observation: K = 1, then our discussion of
downward-sloping demand is straightforward: u
′(xl)
u′(x
l′
)
= pl
p
l′
and concav-
ity implies that quantities and prices must move in opposite directions.
In each of the two observations on the right of Figure 1 we have that
good one is cheaper than good two, and sure enough the chosen con-
sumption bundle involves larger quantities of good one. Thus each
observation alone is UAS -rational.
However, when there is more than one observation, it is possible to
“mix and match” pairs from different observations. In particular, in
5See the references cited for Theorem 3.
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Figure 1 we have
x11 > x
2
1 and x
2
2 > x
1
2 while
p11
p21
p22
x12
> 1.
In this sense, the data violates the downward-sloping demand property.
The sequence of pairs (x11, x
2
1), (x
2
2, x
1
2) is balanced, and it contradicts
the downward-sloping demand condition.
The source of this imposition on the data is again the first-order
condition u
′(xl)
u′(x
l′
)
= pl
p
l′
. If the data were UAS -rational we would need a
utility function that satisfies this first-order condition. Then we would
have to have
1 ≥
u′(x11)
u′(x21)
u′(x22)
u′(x12)
=
p1l
p21
p22
p12
,
which is violated by the data.
“Mix and match” is where the balancedness of sequences comes in.
For the theory to have definitive implications on the relation between
quantity and price, we need to include k on the left of a pair exactly
as many times as we include it on the right.6
4. Choice under risk and uncertainty
To study choice under risk and uncertainty we think of consumption
vectors x as representing state-contingent monetary payoffs. Consider
a finite set S of states of the world with |S| = n, and interpret x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ R
n
+ as a monetary payment that depends on the state.
The vector x pays xi if the i’th state occurs.
Let ∆++ = {µ ∈ R
n
++ :
∑n
s=1 µs = 1} denote the set of strictly
positive probability measures on S. When we talk about risk, we as-
sume that there is given a known (“objective”) probability measure
over states. Risk is common in experimental designs, such as those of
6The axioms in Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2014) present similar issues.
See also the treatment of additively separable utility in Fishburn (1979).
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Choi, Fisman, Gale, and Kariv (2007), Choi, Kariv, Mu¨ller, and Silverman
(2014), and Halevy, Persitz, and Zrill (2018). 7
In situations of uncertainty, in contrast, there is no given probability
measure. Instead, we shall let the probabilities form part of the pref-
erences that should be explaining the data. Uncertainty is of course
prevalent in data from the field. Many lab experiments induce an ob-
jective probability, for example Choi, Fisman, Gale, and Kariv (2007)
and Choi, Kariv, Mu¨ller, and Silverman (2014). There are, however,
experimental designs with uncertainty, such as Hey and Pace (2014)
and Echenique, Imai, and Saito (2019a).
4.1. Risk: Expected utility. Suppose that a probability measure
µ∗ ∈ ∆++ is given and known. Think of µ
∗ as an “objective” proba-
bility; one resulting from a known and objective randomization device.
Such devices are regularly used in laboratory experiments, and the re-
sult that I am about to present is applicable to data drawn from such
laboratory experiments.8
Let UEU be the class of utility functions U : R
n
+ → R for which
there exists a concave and strictly increasing u : R+ → R such that
U(x) ≥ U(y) if and only if
∑
s∈S
µ∗su(xs) ≥
∑
s∈S
µ∗su(ys).
In studies of objective expected utility, a crucial aspect of the dataset
are the price-probability ratios, or “risk neutral prices,” defined as fol-
lows: for k ∈ K and s ∈ S, let ρks = p
k
s/µ
∗
s. To understand the
role of risk-neutral prices, note that the first-order conditions for the
consumer’s optimization problem imply that u′(xs)/u
′(xs′) = ρs/ρs′.
7The experimental literature on risk and uncertainty is extensive. See the recent
survey by Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015). I restrict attention to experiments
that produce the type of datasets assumed in this chapter.
8See Echenique, Imai, and Saito (2018) for an application of this theory to ex-
perimental data.
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Compare this equation with the first-order condition for additive sepa-
rability in our previous discussion: after transforming prices into risk-
neutral prices, the analysis can proceed exactly as in Section 3.
In consequence, the relevant property is
Strong Axiom of Revealed Objective Expected Utility (SAROEU):
Any balanced sequence of pairs has the risk-neutral downward-sloping
property.
We obtain a characterization of UEU -rational datasets.
Theorem 3. A dataset is UEU rational if and only if it satisfies SAROEU.
Theorem 3 is due to Kubler, Selden, and Wei (2014). The appen-
dix to Echenique and Saito (2015) considers a hybrid case, where some
states have subjective and known probabilities, while others do not.
The hybrid case is important to cover data from experiments like those
of Ahn, Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2014) and Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli, and Zame
(2010).
4.2. Uncertainty: Subjective Expected Utility. We shall be in-
terested in the theory of subjective expected utility, the most commonly
used theory of choice under uncertainty.
Let USEU be the class of utility functions U : R
n
+ → R for which there
exists µ ∈ ∆++ and a concave and strictly increasing u : R+ → R such
that U(x) ≥ U(y) if and only if
∑
s∈S
µsu(xs) ≥
∑
s∈S
µsu(ys).
Here µ is interpreted as a subjective belief over states, while u is a
concave utility function over money. The assumption that u is concave
means that I restrict attention to risk-averse consumers.9
With subjective expected utility, the relevant first-order condition is
that
µsu
′(xs)
µs′u′(xs′)
=
ps
ps′
.
9For an analysis that avoids the concavity assumption, see Section 4.4.
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x2
x1
x1
x2
x2
x1
x1
x2
Figure 2. Violation of subjective expected utility
A dataset like the one with xˆ on the left of Figure 1 is USEU -rational
because an agent might choose to consume more in the more expensive
state because she thinks it is the more likely state. We do not have
access to probabilities, which leaves us with fewer constraints than
in UEU : probabilities may be adjusted in constructing a rationalizing
member of USEU .
So what are the USEU -rational data? Consider the data on the left
of Figure 2. It is easy to see that the data is not UAS-rational, but
that does not help us very much because UAS is a more restrictive
theory than USEU . It is also easy to see that the data satisfies the weak
axiom of revealed preference, and is therefore rational for some utility
function (it is ULNS -rational). Of course, this does not tell us whether
the rationalizing utility could be a member of USEU . The way to make
progress turns out to be to consider the 45-degree line.
Suppose that the dataset in Figure 2 were USEU -rational. The ratio-
nalizing utility would then satisfy the tangency properties at x1 and x2
depicted in the diagram on the right of Figure 2. The tangencies ex-
press the first-order conditions I have been talking about. Now consider
the indifference curve at x2, and follow it until it crosses the 45-degree
line. At the crossing point, the tangent line to the indifference curve
must be flatter than the tangent line at x2: a line that coincides with
RISK, UNCERTAINTY, INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 15
the budget line at x2. The reason for why it is flatter is that x2 lies
above the 45-degree line. On the other hand, and symmetrically, the
indifference curve at x1 has a tangent at the 45-degree line that is
steeper than the budget line at x1.
Since the prices at x1 imply a steeper budget line than at x2, we
are forced to conclude that the tangent, on the 45-degree line, to the
indifference curve passing through x1 is steeper than the same tangent
for the indifference curve passing through x2. So the existence of a
rationalizing member of USEU implies that the tangent to the lower
indifference curve at the 45-degree line is steeper than that at the higher
indifference curve.
That is, however, impossible if the data is USEU -rational because
anywhere on the 45-degree line we have x1 = x2, so the tangent has
slope
µ1✘✘✘u
′(x1)
µ2✘✘✘u
′(x2)
=
µ1
µ2
.
The slope of the tangent is the same anywhere on the 45-degree line,
which contradicts what we just concluded from the data on Figure 2.
The relevant property of the data turns out to be the following axiom.
Strong Axiom of Revealed Subjective Expected Utility: Any
doubly balanced sequence of pairs has the downward-sloping demand
property.
Theorem 4. A dataset is USEU rational if and only if it satisfies the
Strong Axiom of Revealed Subjective Expected Utility.
Theorem 4 is due to Echenique and Saito (2015).
4.3. Uncertainty: Maxmin Expected Utility. Subjective expected
utility struggles to account for the phenomenon of aversion to ambigu-
ity: people seem to make choices that are inconsistent with fixed and
stable subjective beliefs. Their choices seem to reflect an aversion to
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equating an uncertain, ambiguous, situation to one with given proba-
bilistic beliefs.10 The leading theory of choice that accounts for such
ambiguity aversion is (arguably) the theory of maxmin expected utility
(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), to which I now turn.
Let UMEU be the class of utility functions U : R
n
+ → R for which
there exists P ⊆ ∆++, nonempty, closed and convex, and a concave
and strictly increasing u : R+ → R such that U(x) ≥ U(y) if and only
if
min{
∑
s∈S
µsu(xs) : µ ∈ P} ≥ min{
∑
s∈S
µsu(ys) : µ ∈ P}.
The results on UMEU rationality require the assumption that |S| = 2:
the set of states if two. Obviously this is a very big limitation, but the
theory is still useful because many lab experiments operate with two
states. So, while it would be very good to have more general results,
the ones we have remain applicable to many relevant datasets.11
We shall need some additional notation. Assuming that there are
only two states, let S = {1, 2}. Given is a dataset {(xk, pk) : k =
1, . . . , K}. Let K0 be the set of all k such that x
k
1 = x
k
2. Let K1 be
the set of all k such that xk1 < x
k
2 , and K2 be the set of all k such that
xk1 > x
k
2. Note that [K] = K0 ∪K1 ∪K2.
Given a sequence of pairs (xkisi , x
k′
i
s′
i
)Ii=1, consider the following nota-
tion: Let Il,s = {i : ki ∈ Kl and si = s}, I
′
l,s = {i : k
′
i ∈ Kl and s
′
i = s},
for l = 0, 1, 2 and s = 1, 2. Thus equipped, the property of interest is
Strong Axiom of Revealed Maxmin Expected Utility: Any
balanced sequence of pairs (xkisi , x
k′
i
s′
i
)Ii=1 in which #I0,1+#I1,1−#I
′
1,1 =
#I ′0,1 +#I
′
2,1 −#I2,1 ≤ 0 has the downward-sloping demand property.
10The evidence usually offered in support of ambiguity aversion is the Ellsberg
paradox, sue to Ellsberg (1961). See Camerer and Weber (1992) for a survey.
11Including Hey and Pace (2014), see Chambers, Echenique, and Saito (2016),
and Echenique, Imai, and Saito (2019a). In fact, in the experiment of Echenique-
Imai-Saito there are three states, but they present a way of testing for MEU using
the two-state result.
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Theorem 5. A dataset is UMEU rational if and only if it satisfies the
Strong Axiom of Revealed Maxmin Expected Utility.
Theorem 5 is due to Chambers, Echenique, and Saito (2016).
The theory of maxmin expected utility presents some challenges that
were not present in expected utility theory. To rationalize a dataset we
have the freedom of choosing different beliefs for different observations.
Such freedom makes it difficult, in general, to obtain a tight axiomati-
zation, but the case of two states has one significant advantage. When
there are only two states, there are only two extreme points to the set
of beliefs P . Moreover, depending on whether xk1 ≤ x
k
2, or x
k
2 ≤ x
k
1, we
know which of the two extremes is relevant in explaining the choice of
xk. If it is xk1 ≤ x
k
2, then the relevant belief must be pessimistic about
state 1. If instead xk2 ≤ x
k
1 then he relevant belief must be pessimistic
about state 2. Theorem 5 is made possible by this property of the
two-state case.
Chambers, Echenique, and Saito (2016) present a characterization of
the datasets that are rationalizable by other theories of choice, includ-
ing Choquet expected utility, and MEU with |S| > 2. These results
are, however, limited to risk neutrality.12
4.4. Expected utility without risk aversion. The discussion so far
has been restricted to models with risk aversion. In consequence, the
tests I have presented are really joint tests of the hypotheses that an
agent is consistent with some particular theory of choice, and that the
agent is risk averse. One can, however, imagine an expected utility-
rational agent, for example, failing such a test because they make
choices that indicate a pure preference for taking on risks. These
choices could for example be on the corners of the budget sets that they
face.13 I now proceed to outline a method for testing EU (and other
12The methods of Polisson, Quah, and Renou (2017), briefly outlined below, can
also be used for general theories of choice under uncertainty.
13It is easy to generate examples of datasets that are not UEU rational as defined
here, but that can be rationalized with a non-concave utility. Expected utility with
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theories of choice under risk and uncertainty) that avoids the assump-
tion of risk aversion. The method is due to Polisson, Quah, and Renou
(2017).
Given a dataset (xk, pk), 1 ≤ k ≤ K, let X ∗ = {xks : 1 ≤ k ≤ K, 1 ≤
s ≤ n} be the set of all observed chosen consumption quantitites.
Define X = {0} ∪ X ∗, and let X n denote the n-fold cartesian product
X × · · · × X .
A data-set (xk, pk)Kk=1 is UEU -rational on the data if there exists a
strictly increasing utility function u : X → R such that, for each k,
xk ∈ argmax{U(x) : x ∈ B(pk, pk · xk) ∩ X n}.
Testing whether a dataset is UEU -rational on the data amounts to
checking whether a utility function can be constructed on finitely many
points to satisfy a system of linear inequalities. It is therefore compu-
tationally easy to do (there are at most (|S|K)2 linear inequalities to
check for satisfaction).
The next result is due to Polisson, Quah, and Renou (2017).
Theorem 6. A dataset is UEU -rational if and only if it is UEU -rational
on the data.
The importance of Theorem 6 is that budget sets are infinite, and
therefore there is in principle no computationally feasible way of check-
ing UEU -rationality. The result of Polisson, Quah, and Renou (2017)
says that such a computational method is readily available, and amounts
to checking whether a utility can be constructed on the data.14 The re-
sults on risk aversion that I have discussed earlier in the chapter avoid
the issue by using the sufficiency of first-order conditions: there are
finitely many of those.
risk aversion implies a normal demand function, so an example can be generated
using the conditions in Cherchye, Demuynck, and Rock (2018).
14A very general result in Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya (2017) also implies
that a computable test exists, but not that it is efficiently computable.
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The statement in Theorem 6 resembles part of Afriat’s theorem,
which can also be understood as saying that a dataset is rational if and
only if it can be rationalized on the data.15
Polisson et. al. provide a more general set of tools than evidenced
by Theorem 6. They provide a framework for testing a general class of
models of choice under risk (including models of non-expected utility
such as rank-dependent utility), and uncertainty — including SEU, but
also models of ambiguity aversion. For some of these models, however,
computational tractability is lost.
In addition to the binary pass/not-pass test I have discussed, Polis-
son et. al. develop an approach to measuring the distance between the
theory and a dataset. Their approach is based on adapting Afriat’s
critical cost efficiency index to their test.
4.5. Probabilistic sophistication. Perhaps the most basic Bayesian
model of decision under uncertainty is due to Machina and Schmeidler
(1992), who propose that an agent is probabilistically sophisticated if
x ∈ Rn+ is evaluated based on the distribution that it induces on R+,
given some prior µ. That is, choices are as if there is some probability
distribution µ such that x is preferred to x′ whenever the distribu-
tion Fx(z) = µ({s ∈ S : xs ≤ z}) is ranked above the distribution
Fx′(z) = µ({s ∈ S : x
′
s ≤ z}). Probabilistic sophistication requires
that the preferences over distributions respect monotonicity in first-
order stochastic dominance, but imposes no additional restrictions.
Formally, let UPS be the set of utility functions U : R
n
+ → R for
which there exists µ ∈ ∆++ and a function V : D → R, where D is the
set of distributions on R with finite support, and V is monotone with
respect to first-order stochastic dominance, such that U(x) ≥ U(x′) iff
v(Fx) ≥ V (Fx′)
15See also Quah (2014), who presents a result that is similar in spirit, for sepa-
rability in demand, and Polisson (2018) who studies additive separability without
imposing concavity.
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Epstein (2000) works out a basic implication of probabilistic sophis-
tication for datasets (xk, pk). He shows that
Theorem 7. If a dataset (xk, pk) 1 ≤ k ≤ K is UPS -rational then there
cannot exists k, k′ ∈ {1, . . . , K} and s, t ∈ S such that
(1) pkt ≥ p
k
s and p
k′
s ≥ p
k′
t , with at least one inequality being strict,
(2) and xkt > x
k
s and x
k′
s > x
k′
t .
The idea behind Theorem 7 is that if the agent’s choices are guided
by probabilities (if what matters about the choice of x is only the
probability distribution over money that it induces), then pkt > p
k
s and
xkt > x
k
s means that the probability of state t must be strictly greater
than the probability of state s. The reason is that, when pkt > p
k
s , the
agent could modify xk by choosing to consume xkt in state s and x
k
s
in state t: the modified vector would cost less than xk, and therefore
be affordable. For the modified vector not to first-order stochastically
dominate xk, the state t must be more likely than s. Now, of course,
having made that inference based on observation (xk, pk), it should not
be contradicted by observation (xk
′
, pk
′
).
Theorem 7 provides a necessary condition for a dataset to be UPS -
rational. It is an open problem to establish a necessary and sufficient
condition (a “revealed preference characterization”) for probabilistic
sophistication. A natural question is whether probabilistic sophistica-
tion can be distinguished empirically from the more stringent theory of
subjective expected utility; this question is answered in the affirmative
by Echenique and Saito (2015), who exhibit an example of a dataset
that is UPS -rational but not USEU -rational.
16
16In the case of risk, with objectively known probabilities, a test of
monotonicity with respect to first-order stochastic dominance is developed by
Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2017) and implemented by Polisson, Quah, and Renou
(2017).
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5. Intertemporal choice: exponential discounting
I shall be interested in the theory of exponentially discounted utility,
the most widely applied theory of intertemporal choice. Let UEDU
be the class of utility functions U : RT+ → R for which there exists
δ ∈ (0, 1] and u : R+ → R such that U(x) ≥ U(y) if and only if
∑
t∈T
δtu(xt) ≥
∑
t∈T
δtu(yt)
Note that, while they are meant to be applied to different envi-
ronments, UEDU ⊆ USEU . So the axiom that characterizes UEDU -
rationality has to be more stringent than the Strong Axiom of Revealed
Subjective Expected Utility.17 In fact, instead of a doubly-balanced se-
quence we shall count time periods on the left and on the right of each
pair in the sequence.
Strong Axiom of Revealed Exponentially Discounted Utility:
Any balanced sequence of pairs (xkiti , x
k′
i
t′
i
)Ii=1 for which
∑I
i=1 ti ≥
∑I
i=1 t
′
i,
has the downward-sloping demand property.
The Strong Axiom of Revealed Exponentially Discounted Utility has
a simple explanation. Suppose, for example, that one observation in
the dataset satisfies xk3 > x
k
2, meaning that the consumer chooses larger
consumption in period 4 than in period 3. This can only be compatible
with discounted utility (which implies an impatient consumer) if con-
sumption in period 4 is cheaper than in period 3. In contrast, xk2 > x
k
3
is possible regardless of how prices compare, because the consumer’s
discount factor could account for her desire to consume early, even
when it is more expensive. More generally,
∑n
i=1 ti ≥
∑n
i=1 t
′
i says that
the consumption quantities xkiti occur later in time than the quantities
x
k′
i
t′
i
. If, in any pair, the former are always lager than the latter, the
only explanation must be a corresponding movement in prices.
The result, obtained in Echenique, Imai, and Saito (2019b), is that:
17In the intertemporal context, USEU is comprised of utilities with the form∑
t
D(t)u(xt), where D(t) > 0 is a general discount function.
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Theorem 8. A dataset is UEDU rational if and only if it satisfies Strong
Axiom of Revealed Exponentially Discounted Utility.
It is possible to obtain many results in the same spirit as Theo-
rem 8. Echenique, Imai, and Saito (2019b) gives revealed preference
axioms for many other theories of intertemporal choice, including quasi-
hyperbolic discounting, and monotone time discounting. Echenique et.
al. implement these tests on data drawn from experiments by Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012) and Carvalho, Meier, and Wang (2016).
There is a long literature on the testable implications of models of
intertemporal choice. I want to mention two papers that follow in
the revealed preference tradition. Dziewulski (2018) also considers ex-
ponentially discounted utility and its generalizations, but focuses on
datasets that arise from pairwise comparisons; not choice from budgets.
Adams, Cherchye, De Rock, and Verriest (2014) is a study of intertem-
poral choice and dynamic consistency, but their analysis of household
consumption is outside the (narrow) scope of my chapter.
6. Multiple physical goods
One of the limitations of the results we have presented is that they
are restricted to the case of a single physical good (“money”) in each
time period or state. As a consequence, the results are applicable to
common economic environments where agents choose dated, or state-
contingent, monetary payoffs. It is, however, easy to envision economic
applications with multiple physical goods, and where the multiplicity is
a crucial component of the environment. An important application is to
data from consumption surveys, where an agent or a household, records
their purchases of multiple consumption goods over time. The methods
I have discussed so far would require that one aggregate the multiple
goods into one. Such aggregation is complicated, both conceptually
and practically.18
18That said, most revealed preference studies of data from consumption surveys
do some sort of aggregation. Different kinds of meat or cheese are comprised into
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I shall briefly outline some revealed-preference studies that avoid the
assumption of a single physical goods.
6.1. Risk. Suppose that there are L physical goods, and S states of
the world. Consumption space is therefore RLS+ , with n = LS being
the number of goods. As in Section 4.1, suppose given a probability
measure µ∗ ∈ ∆++ ⊆ R
S
+. Let UEU be the class of utility functions
U : RLS+ → R for which there exists a concave and strictly increasing
u : RL+ → R such that U(x) ≥ U(y) iff
∑
s∈S
µ∗su(xs) ≥
∑
s∈S
µ∗su(ys).
A data set is, again, a collection (xk, pk), 1 ≤ k ≤ K. It is now
useful to collect all the observed quantities in a set: Let X = {xks ∈
RL+ : 1 ≤ k ≤ K, 1 ≤ s ≤ S}. Denote by ∆(X ) the set of all probability
distributions on X (a finite set).
Recall at this point the revealed preference binary relations I intro-
duced in Section 2.2.1. We shall need to consider new revealed pref-
erence relations on ∆(X ), but these build on RP and P P . Say that
x RC z if there exists z′ ∈ ∆(X ) such that x RP z′, and that z is a
mean-preferving spread of z′. Similarly, say that x PC z if there exists
z′ ∈ ∆(X ) such that x P P z′, and z is a mean-preserving spread of
z′.19
Next, Theorem 9 is a composite of contributions by Varian (1983),
Green and Srivastava (1986), and Chambers, Liu, and Martinez (2016).20
Theorem 9. The following statements are equivalent:
aggregate “meat good,” “cheese good,” and so on. See Chambers and Echenique
(2016) for an overview of this issue.
19The idea of “composing” the revealed preference relation with a given
(fixed) binary relation to reflect a monotonicity property is common in re-
vealed preference theory. See, for example, Chambers and Echenique (2009) and
Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2017).
20See also Diewert (2012) and Varian (1988).
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(1) For any sequence {zk}Kk=1 in ∆(X ) with x
k RC zk, and any
vector pi ∈ RK+ with
∑
k pi
k = 1, if
∑
k pi
kxk =
∑
k pi
kzk, then
pik = 0 for all k with xk PC zk.
(2) For all functions hks : K × S → R+ with the property that
µ∗s =
∑
k′
∑
s′
hks(k
′, s′) =
∑
k′
∑
s′
hk
′
s′ (k, s)
for all k and s,
xk RP (
∑
k′
∑
s′ h
k
s(k
′, s′)xk
′
s′
µ∗s
)s
for all k implies that it is not the case that
xk P P (
∑
k′
∑
s′
hks(k
′, s′)
xk
′
s′
µ∗s
)s
for some k.
(3) There exists Uks ≥ 0 and λ
k > 0 such that
Uks ≤ U
k′
s′ + λ
k′ p
k′
s′ s
pis′
(xks − x
k′
s′ )
(4) The data is UEU -rational.
Statement (3) provides Afriat inequalities for the problem at hand.
The equivalence between (3) and (4) is due to Varian (1983) and
Green and Srivastava (1986). The rest of Theorem 9 is due to Chambers, Liu, and Martinez
(2016).
The property in Statement (1) is a revealed-preference axiom similar
to Fishburn’s (Fishburn, 1975), but in the consumption theory context.
The axiom is a simple consequence of UEU -rationality: If each x
k is re-
vealed preferred to zk, and we take a convex combination of the x’s and
the z’s that yield identical lotteries, then the convex combination can-
not place positive weight on any xk that is strictly revealed preferred
to the corresponding zk. Put differently, if I have two ways of compos-
ing the same (reduced) lottery, one with support in the xks and the
other with support in the zks, the first collection of lotteries cannot all
be better than the second collection, with some of them being strictly
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better. It is easy to see that this property (1) is implied by EU. What
is surprising here is that it is also sufficient for UEU -rationality.
It may be of interest to see that the property in Statement (1) implies
GARP. Suppose given a sequence of observations xki , 1 ≤M (M ≥ 2),
with xki RP xki+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ M − 1, and xkM P P xk1 . Then letting
zki = zki+1 (using summation modM), and a uniform distribution over
the xki and zki gives a violation of Statement (1).
The property in Statement (2) results from applying linear pro-
gramming duality to the system of Afriat inequalities in (3). Since
µ∗s =
∑
k′
∑
s′ h
k
s(k
′, s′), the function hks can be thought of as provid-
ing mean preserving spreads. Then (1) can be reduced to (1): see
Chambers, Liu, and Martinez (2016) for details. The equivalence be-
tween (2) and (3) is a matter of Farkas lemma (see Chambers and Echenique
(2016) for an exposition of this methodology).
6.2. Intertemporal choice. I now turn to intertemporal choice with
multiple physical goods, and present a result due to Martin Browning.
The model is restricted to a dataset with K = 1. That is, with a
single observation. We call such datasets survey data because they are
common in cross-sectional consumption surveys.
A survey dataset (x, p) = ((xt)
T
t=1, (pt)
T
t=1) satisfies cyclic monotonic-
ity if, for any sequence of observations, (xti , pti)
M
i=1
M∑
i=1
pti · (xti+1 − xti) ≤ 0,
where we are employing addition mod M in the calculation of subinde-
ces of t.
Let UNDU be the set of all utility functions U such that
U(x1, . . . , xT ) =
T∑
t=1
u(xt),
where u : RL+ → R is continuous and concave.
The next result is due to Browning (1989).
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Theorem 10. A survey dataset (a dataset with K = 1) is UNDU ra-
tional if and only if it satisfies cyclic monotonicity.
The idea behind Theorem 10 is simple. Suppose, for the sake of
exposition, that a rationalizing u is differentiable. Then the first-order
condition that a UNDU rational dataset must satisfy is
Du(xt) = λpt, 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
This means that 1/λpt must constitute the values of the gradient of a
concave funciton. It is well known that cyclic monotonicity character-
izes the gradients of concave functions (see Rockafellar (1997)).
Crawford (2010) generalizes the ideas in Browning (1989) to study
a model with exponential discount and habit formation. See also
Demuynck and Verriest (2013) for a revealed preference analysis of
habit-forming durable goods.
7. Conclusion
Revealed preference theory has traditionally explored the empirical
content of the theory of optimizing behavior. An emergent literature
has extended the theory to cover specific functional forms that are
important in specific economic environments. In the chapter, I have
reviewed the recent literature focused on the economic environments
of risk, uncertainty, and intertemporal choice. The last five years have
seen significant advances in our understanding of the empirical content
of some of the most widely used models of choice for such environments.
These theoretical advances are mirrored in the emergence of novel
experimental designs for choice under economic budget sets. The re-
sulting experimental datasets provide an excellent opportunity for test-
ing important economic theories under controlled conditions and weak
assumptions. My chapter has focused on theoretical results, but sev-
eral recent papers have used the revealed-preference tests developed in
the theoretical work, and applied them to experimental data.
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